openpgp “unmaintained package” advisoryGO-2026-5932 says that
golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp is unmaintained and unsafe by design. This is
not a bug in one version: it is introduced at version 0 with no fixed version,
the Go vulnerability database’s way of saying “the whole package is deprecated;
do not use it.” No upgrade of golang.org/x/crypto ever clears it.
It is not a Panurus vulnerability. govulncheck only raises it against code
that actually imports the package, and Panurus imports neither
golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp nor any of its subpackages (packet, armor,
clearsign, errors, elgamal, s2k), in any module. The risk the advisory
warns about lands on whoever chooses to use OpenPGP — and Panurus has not made
that choice. If OpenPGP were ever needed, the advisory’s own advice is to use the
maintained drop-in fork
github.com/ProtonMail/go-crypto/openpgp.
depguard rule in .golangci.yml denies
importing golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp and
github.com/ProtonMail/go-crypto/openpgp (and their subpackages), so openpgp
cannot be introduced through first-party code without a failing lint.ci/govulncheck-allowlist.txt as a
standing, pre-approved disposition (today it reports nothing). Recording it in
advance means that if a future transitive dependency ever pulled openpgp into
the build, CI would fail loudly for a maintainer to re-review rather than the
finding appearing out of nowhere. The correct response then is to move the code
onto github.com/ProtonMail/go-crypto/openpgp and drop the entry, not to lean
on the allow-list.ci/govulncheck-allowlist.txt