The ZK-ATDLOG (zkatdlog/nogh/v1) driver supports two interchangeable range-proof systems,
selected per public-parameters set via rp.ProofType:
token/core/zkatdlog/nogh/v1/crypto/rp/bulletproof/) — an IPA-based range
proof.token/core/zkatdlog/nogh/v1/crypto/rp/csp/) — a Compressed Sigma Protocol range
proof.Both are non-interactive via the Fiat-Shamir transform: every verifier challenge is derived
by hashing the statement and the prover’s prior messages instead of being sent by an
interactive verifier. Both share one implementation of that hashing, common.Transcript
(token/core/zkatdlog/nogh/v1/crypto/common/transcript.go) — an Absorb/Squeeze running
SHA-256 state, seeded by a protocol-specific domain separator. This page documents the exact
absorb/squeeze order each system relies on, and why it must be followed exactly.
A Fiat-Shamir challenge is only as binding as what it is hashed from. If a challenge were derived from a strict subset of what the protocol’s security proof requires — say, from only the two most recent prover messages, instead of from the full transcript so far — a cheating prover could choose the inputs to that smaller hash after fixing an earlier, unbound part of the proof. That would be a soundness break: the prover would get to pick values that satisfy an equation the verifier assumed were committed before the challenge existed. Both range-proof systems below are built so that every challenge instead depends on the full transcript absorbed so far.
token/core/zkatdlog/nogh/v1/crypto/rp/bulletproof/rp.go runs a single common.Transcript,
seeded with InitHasherWithDomain(TranscriptDomain) where
TranscriptDomain = "Bulletproof-RangeProof-v1", through the entire range proof and its
inner IPA sub-proof. Prover (rangeProver.preprocess/Prove) and verifier
(rangeVerifier.Verify/verifyIPA) absorb in this exact order:
CommitmentGenerators ‖ LeftGenerators ‖ RightGenerators ‖
BitLength (absorbPublicStatement). This binds a proof to the specific generator basis
and bit length it was produced under.V, then the bit-decomposition commitments C, D — squeeze y,
then squeeze z.T1, T2 — squeeze x.Q, its
folded commitment, and the claimed inner product — squeeze the IPA’s first challenge.(L_i, R_i) pair before squeezing that
round’s challenge, so round i’s challenge depends on every round 0..i-1 before it.The IPA can also be run on its own, outside a range proof (see
bulletproof.NewIPAProver/NewIPAVerifier’s tests). A standalone caller must seed its own
common.Transcript — NewIPAProver/NewIPAVerifier take the transcript as a required
parameter with no self-seeding fallback — using
StandaloneIPATranscriptDomain = "Bulletproof-IPA-v1", a domain distinct from the
range-proof one, so a standalone IPA’s challenges can never collide with one nested inside a
range proof.
token/core/zkatdlog/nogh/v1/crypto/rp/csp/rp.go and csp/csp.go share the same
common.Transcript. Its initial state — the TranscriptHeader — absorbs the CSP public
statement once per public-parameters set (PublicParams.initCSPTranscriptHeader, in
token/core/zkatdlog/nogh/v1/setup/setup.go): PedersenGenerators ‖ LeftGenerators ‖
RightGenerators ‖ BitLength, under the domain "CSP-RangeProof-v1". That header is
not part of the wire encoding (there is no corresponding proto field); every loader of a
*PublicParams must call initCSPTranscriptHeader before any CSP proof is produced or
verified. It is invoked from both PublicParams.NewWith (the genesis/prover path) and
PublicParams.Validate (every load path, since validators and provers alike call Validate
after deserializing a *PublicParams), so this holds in practice, but it is a precondition
worth knowing if you construct a *PublicParams by some other path.
From that header, rangeProver.Prove/rangeVerifier.Verify absorb the value commitment,
then run the Schnorr proof of knowledge and the inner CSP (compressed sigma protocol) proof
in lockstep, each absorbing its own prover messages before squeezing the next challenge.
WithTranscriptHeader is a required, non-empty parameter throughout this chain — every
constructor hard-fails on an empty header rather than falling back to a different seed.
Neither range-proof system’s transcript, nor the companion TypeAndSum
(token/core/zkatdlog/nogh/v1/transfer/typeandsum.go) / SameType
(token/core/zkatdlog/nogh/v1/issue/sametype.go) proofs, absorb anything from the
surrounding transaction — the token request, the transfer/issue action, the other inputs, or
the signing anchor. Each sub-proof’s transcript is independent; the only thing tying a range
proof to the rest of a transfer/issue action is that both operate on the same
output - commitmentToType commitment, and TypeAndSumVerifier.Verify does bind that
commitment into its own challenge. In practice this only matters for an output whose
commitment (type, value, and blinding factor together) is byte-identical across two
transactions — already an unusual case that double-spend protection at the token layer is
responsible for handling — but it is a real gap in defense-in-depth. See
#2515 for related follow-up.